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In this paper we explore the variety of monetary policy transmission chan-
nels in an agent-based macroeconomic model. We identify eight transmis-
sion channels and present a model based on Caiani et al. Caiani et al., 2016,
extended with an inter-bank market. We then analyze model simulation
results of interest rate shocks in terms of GDP and inflation for four of the
transmission channels. We find these effects to be small, in line with the
view that monetary policy is an weak tool to control inflation.
Keywords: Agent-based modelling, Stock Flow Consistent modelling, Mon-
etary transmission, Inflation.
1 Introduction
The behavior of inflation is a mystery to central bankers, as Federal Reserve
Chair Janet Yellen recently put it Yellen, 2017. One contributing reason
may be the structure of the New Keynesian Dynamics Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) models typically used in central bank to model inflation
Blanchard, 2016, and dissatisfaction with their unrealistic assumptions is
now widespread Caballero, 2010; Romer, 2016; Stiglitz, 2017. Blanchard
Blanchard, 2016 calls for the economics profession to explore different model
types.
Agent-based models (ABM) are one such alternative. Fagiolo and Roven-
tini Fagiolo and Roventini, 2017 provide an overview of AB models which
have been applied to study the effects of monetary policy. Monetary policy
transmission is modelled in different ways across these models. For exam-
ple, in Raberto et al. Raberto, Teglio, and Cincotti, 2008, Salle et al. Salle,
Yıldızog˘lu, and Se´ne´gas, 2013, Salle Salle, 2015, Dosi et al. Dosi et al., 2015,
and Popoyan et al. Popoyan, Napoletano, and Roventini, 2017 the central
bank inflation target influences household inflation expectations, feeding into
wage demands, costs, and output prices. Bouchaud et al. Bouchaud et al.,
2017 follow the same approach; in addition, past inflation affects expecta-
tions. In Delli Gatti and Desiderio Delli Gatti and Desiderio, 2015, more
fragile firms pay higher interest rates, leading to credit rationing. Further-
more, like in Gualdi et al. Gualdi et al., 2015, higher interest rates decrease
the demand for credit. In many models central bank rates affect house-
hold consumption through wealth effects Gualdi et al., 2015; Salle, 2015, or
changes in the propensity to consume Bouchaud et al., 2017.
Thus, different models implement different channels. In order to enhance
the comparability of findings in the agent-based literature, we present a
taxonomy of monetary policy transmission channels. We then simulate four
transmission channels in a modified version of the Caiani et al. Caiani et al.,
2016 benchmark model. We highlight a variety of behavioural and structural
assumptions which affect outcomes in terms of GDP and inflation. Model
outcomes are consistent with a relatively small efficacy of monetary policy
in controlling inflation.
2 Transmission Channels
Monetary policy is usually interpreted as setting the central bank interest
rate. In practice, this means changing two rates: one as a compensation
for depositing reserves and another charged to counterparties who borrow
reserves from the central bank. Together, these are known as the Standing
Lending Facilities (SLF). Lee and Sarkar Lee and Sarkar, 2017 provide a
detailed discussion and comparison for major central banks.
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Typically, central banks change the interest rate based on an inflation
target. The transmission of monetary policy refers to the process of interest
rate changes working their way through the economy, ultimately to affect the
rate of inflation Bank of Canada, 2012. There are several channels through
which this transmission can occur.
First, in the expectations channel, private sector behaviour depends on
the expected course of monetary policy, as well as on the current policy.
Agents might change their behaviour as they anticipate the effects of mon-
etary policy Bernanke, 2004. For example, inflation expectations might di-
rectly influence household consumption and firm pricing decisions. If house-
holds expect higher inflation in the future, they increase consumption now,
increasing inflationary pressures. Or, if firms expect higher inflation in the
future, they might increase their prices now. Figure 1 summarizes these
effects.
Figure 1: Expectations channel
Different from the expectations channel, the other transmission channels
describe behavioural changes in response to changes in current interest rates.
For these channels to work it is vital that SLF rate changes induce changes
in other key interest rates in the economy. This is known in the literature
as interest rate pass-through Von Borstel, Eickmeier, and Krippner, 2016.
If there is some pass-through, the literature identifies at least seven chan-
nels by which changes in policy rates affect inflation: a bank lending chan-
nel Disyatat, 2011, a balance sheet channel Bernanke and Gertler, 1989,
an investment channel Mojon, Smets, and Vermeulen, 2002, an asset price
channel Bernanke and Gertler, 1995, a consumption channel Lettau, Lud-
vigson, and Steindel, 2002, a cost channel Barth III and Ramey, 2002, and
an exchange rate channel Svensson, 1999.
The bank lending and balance sheet channels, collectively known as the
credit channel, describe how banks reduce credit supply after a policy rate
hike. According to the bank lending channel, as banks’ funding costs in-
crease and their profitability falls, they reduce the quantity of credit they
are willing to lend Disyatat, 2011. Through the balance sheet channel, an
increase in interest rate lowers firms’ future revenues, reducing the net worth
of firms. In response, banks reduce the credit supply to these firms.
On the credit demand side, firms‘ desire to invest might decrease as a con-
sequence of monetary policy tightening. The investment channel Mishkin,
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1995 describes how higher bank lending rates discourage business investment
by reducing the value of investment, and therefore the value of assets reflect-
ing these investments. This asset price channel suggests that the resulting
decrease in firms’ net worth reduces investment demand by firms Mishkin,
1996.
In the consumption channel Mishkin, 1995, changes in interest rates
might affect household consumption decisions through a wealth effect, as in-
terest rates hikes affect asset values.Lettau, Ludvigson, and Steindel, 2002.
Also, a rate increase makes it more worthwhile to save, decreasing the
propensity to consume.
In addition, Barth and Ramey Barth III and Ramey, 2002 propose the
existence of a cost channel in which changes in interest rates transmit to
changes in funding costs for firms which then translate into higher output
prices.
With the exception of the cost channel and the wealth effect in the
consumption channel, in all of the channels described above, SLF policy
rate increases are expected to reduce GDP relative to its potential level,
thereby increasing the output gap “New Perspectives on Monetary Policy,
Inflation, and the Business Cycle” and reducing inflationary pressures.
Figure 2 provides an overview of all interest rate channels and shows that
the net effect of these channels combined is not clear a priori. the strenght of
individual effects is unknown, effects may have opposite signs, and there may
be interaction effects between different channels. For example, increased
consumption through the consumption channel might amplify the balance
sheet channel: it causes an increase in firm’s net-worth.
This makes it challenging to open the ‘black box‘ of conditions in which
policy transmission does or does not occur Bernanke and Gertler, 1995.
Nonetheless, we will attempt to take a peek inside the black box and simulate
an interest rate hike in an agent-based model in which the consumption,
investment, bank lending, and cost channel are active.
3 The Model
To analyse monetary policy transmission, we modify the Caiani et al. Caiani
et al., 2016 benchmark model of a closed economy (i.e. without foreign or
’rest of world’ sector).
We add the ability to shock the central bank SLF policy rates. To
simulate interest rate pass-through, we add an inter-bank market in which
banks operate between the central bank determined upper and lower limits.
We also add and change several behavioural rules related to bank lending,
interest rates, firm pricing, dividends, liquidity, and capital ratios. Finally,
to distinguish more between short-term and long-term debt, we change the
time-scale so that periods represent months instead of quarters, we updated
3
Figure 2: Domestic monetary policy transmission channels
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interest rates accordingly. The updated model is able to simulate the bank
lending channel, investment channel, consumption channel, and cost channel
along with their interactions.
The balance sheet channel is not operational in the model because banks
do not discount the value of collateral. The asset price channel does not ex-
ist because firm investment decisions are based on desired growth of output
which in turn is based on real factors. Then, they try to finance investment
with retained earnings before turning to loans. Therefore, a reduction in net-
worth does not reduce investment demand. Finally, inflation expectations
are formed adaptively, as a consequence of past inflation. Consequently,
there is no expectations channel through which the central bank can influ-
ence agent expectations directly. We implement the model using the Java
Macro Agent-Based (JMAB) package. 1
3.1 Agents
There are six types of agents x: households hh, firms f (divided into con-
sumption goods firms cf and capital goods firms kf), banks b, a central
bank cb, and a government g. All agents have state variables which are rep-
resented by a matrix Vx. Table 3 (in the Appendix) provides an overview
of the state variables Vx and their domains. In the notation of variables,
subscripts indicate the agent and time step of the variable. Superscripts
indicate if the variable or parameter refers to another variable, or is an
expectation (e), demanded (d), supplied (s), or targeted (tr) variable.
3.2 Markets
All markets use a common matching protocol. This lets a demand agent
observe a random subset of suppliers, the size of which is determined by
parameter χ representing information asymmetry in that market. Demand
agents pick the supplier who offers the best price; but if the demand agent
has a previous supplier it sticks to this supplier with a probability of changing





pχ if pχ > pk
0 otherwise
, (1)
where  represents the intensity of choice, pχ the lowest observed supplier
price, and pk the price of the selected supplier. In case the preferred supplier
has run out of inventory, the agent picks the supplier with the next best price.
If the agent demand was filled or the supplier has run out of inventory,
the protocol stops. In some markets, when the supplier has run out of
inventory, the demand agent can select a new random supplier from the
subset. Figure 3 below depicts the market matching protocol.
1the source code for this model can be found at: https://github.com/S120/Interbank
5
Figure 3: Market matching protocol
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3.3 Simulation overview
We simulate agent actions and interactions over n periods. As a consequence
of these actions and interactions, the state variables of the agents are imme-
diately updated. Unless stated otherwise, agents are processed in a random
order. Each period represents a month in which we simulate the following
sequence of events:
1. expectation formation,
2. firms’ output determination,
3. bad debts removal,
4. firms’ price determination,
5. capital goods market - first interaction,
6. investment demand,
7. bank’s internal interest rates,
8. deposit rates,
9. credit demand,
10. firms’ labour demand,
11. credit market interactions,
12. labour supply,
13. government labour demand,
14. central bank policy,
15. labour market interactions,
16. firms’ production,
17. consumption demand,
18. consumption goods market interaction,
19. capital goods market - second interaction,
20. tax rate determination
21. payments on obligations,
22. deposit market interactions,
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23. defaults,
24. bond market - first interaction,
25. interbank market interactions,
26. central bank bond demand,
27. bond market - second interaction,
28. central bank lending facilities.
3.4 Simulation scheduling
In this section, we describe in detail the simulation algorithm for every
period. Agents are boundedly rational Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002. They
can observe their own state variables, the values of their state variables in the
previous period, and some state variables of other agents. In their decision
making, they follow simple heuristics based on limited information.
3.4.1 Expectation formation
At the start of every period, each agent computes expected values for state
variables in Vx based on the simple adaptive rule:
V ex,t = V
e
x,t−1 + γ(Vx,t−1 − V ex,t−1), (2)
where γ is an adaptive parameter.
3.4.2 Firms’ output determination
Firms compute an output target, otrf,t, by subtracting current inventories
X = {KG,CG} (capital or consumption goods depending on firm type),






f,t)−Xt with X = {KG,CG}. (3)
3.4.3 Bad debts removal
In the next step, banks remove any loans from bankrupt debtors, nLb,t, from
their balance sheets.
Lb,t = Lb,t−1 − nLb,t. (4)
If the debtor is a consumption firm, the bank recovers collateral C by
forcing its sale, from which it recovers the proceeds, C = KGιcf . Since
capital firms do not have collateral, the loss from their bad loans is fully
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borne by banks, who try to diminish this through sale of the firm‘s physical
capital to households.
3.4.4 Firms’ price determination
To determine output prices pf,t, firms often take into account costs as well
as market conditions Alvarez and Hernando, 2005. Firms apply a mark-up
Ψucf,t over their expected unit labour costs (uc
e
f,t) times the foreseen amount





) ucef,tltrf,t + iLf,t−1Lf,t
otxt
. (5)
Firms revise their mark-up adaptively depending on their inventory
and capacity utilization, reflecting market conditions. If current inventory
Gx,t−1, or production capacity ot−1 are below (above) targets Gtrf,t , o
∗
t−1,
the mark-up is increased (decreased) by a stochastic amount FN ,
Ψulcx,t =
{
Ψulcx,t−1 (1 + FN) if
CGx,t−1




Ψulcx,t−1 (1− FN) otherwise
, (6)
where FN is a random number drawn from a folded normal distribution
with parameters µFN , σ
2
FN .
3.4.5 Capital market - first interaction
Consumption firms try to find the cheapest capital supplier. They observe
a subset of suppliers and then select the cheapest, following the market
procedure presented in Figure 3.
3.4.6 Investment demand
Consumption firms now determine investment demand. They target a de-
sired production capacity rate of growth κtrcf,t based on their target rate of









Firms then derive demand for capital goods kgtc,tr based on their target
output growth, taking into account capital replacement. This results in
their nominal investment demand KGdc,t as the product of units of capital





3.4.7 Bank’s internal interest rates
In the next step, banks determine their internal interest rate on loans, iLb,t.






b ). To this
rate they either add or subtract a stochastic amount FN . This depends on
whether they meet their capital ratio target. Thus, well capitalized banks
decrease their rate to attract more borrowers and vice versa.
iLb,t =
{
fcb,t (1 + FN) if CRb,t < CR
tr
b,t
fcb,t(1− FN) otherwise , (9)
where the capital ratio is calculated by dividing equity value by the value
of assets, CR = ER+B+L . Bank credit supply is limited only by demand,
regulation, and bank’s own rationing policy McLeay, Radia, and Thomas,
2014 as explained below.
3.4.8 Deposit rates
Banks try to attract deposits by setting deposit interest rates iDb,t based
















1 if ∆rt ≥ 0
−1 otherwise .
If the combined values are sufficiently small, a bank will attempt to
attract deposits by increasing its interest rate by the stochastic term FN .
Otherwise, it will decrease the rate.
iDb,t =
{
iDb,t−1 (1 + FN) if χ
LR + χr + χfu ≥ 0
iDb,t−1 (1− FN) otherwise
. (10)
3.4.9 Credit demand
Then, firms compute their need for credit, Ldf,t. They compute their ex-
pected expenditures as nominal desired investment, Itrf,t, plus the dividends
they expect to distribute, dvef,t, plus the labour use, lf,tlcf,t. Then, adhering
to the pecking order theory, they try to fund investment using their oper-
ating cash flows and deposits Df,t first. Furthermore, firms try to keep an
extra liquidity buffer for loan payments ζw. The remainder is asked on the
credit markets.
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Ldc,t = max{Idf,t + dvef,t + ζwlf,tlcf,t −OCF ef,t −Df,t, 0}, (11)
where OCF represents operating cash flows after taxes. Computed as after-
tax profits plus capital amortization costs, minus changes in inventories and
debt repayments.
3.4.10 Labour demand
Firms hire workers. Capital goods firms calculate the output level they can
achieve based on their capital stock, and then set labour hiring needs ∆ldkf,t.
If negative, some random workers are laid off until there are just enough to





where µl is the productivity of labour.
Consumption firms review their desired capacity utilization, ucf,t and







where δk is the constant capital labour ratio and ucf,t is the rate of ca-









Firms then enter the credit market and request a loan from the cheapest
supplier. The bank responds by calculating expected profit re as the net






−∆L− (LGD ∗ θdf ∗ L), (14)




n)Lf is the debt





is the probability of default, where β is
a parameter of risk-aversion. If expected profit is positive, banks grant the
loan in full. Otherwise, the loan is denied.
3.4.12 Labour supply
Households which are unemployed for longer than their threshold, mhh,t >
φm update their desired wage wtrhh,t by subtracting stochastic amount FN
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from the last period‘s level. Employed households increase their asked wage






whh,t−1(1 + FN) otherwise
. (15)
Additionally, every period a share of workers ζu, leave their current
employer and look for a new job.
3.4.13 Government labour demand
The government is committed to hiring a constant number of households,




3.4.14 Central bank policy
The supply of central bank advances is not limited or rationed. The central
bank has a fixed lending facility rate iRcb,t . In periods tmon in which monetary
policy changes occur, the lending facility rate changes by an amount Ψmon.
iRcb,t =
{
iRcb,t−1 + Ψmon if t = tmon
iRcb,t−1 otherwise
. (17)
Much like the Bank of England Bank of England, 2012, it sets the rate
on advances iAcb,t as a mark-up, ΨiR over the official bank rate,
iAcb,t = i
R
cb,t + ΨiR. (18)
The central bank also sets a countercyclical capital buffer based on the
credit-to-GDP ratio European System Risk Board, 2014. In line with the
Basel III capital requirements:
CRtrt =





CRtrt−1 −Ψpru if LtYt < φpru
CRtrt−1 otherwise
, (19)
where Y is nominal GDP. The central bank also aims to minimize sys-
temic liquidity risk, defined as a situation in which banks’ normal funding
and refinancing channels fail European System Risk Board, 2014, prompting
the central bank to act as lender of last resort. Therefore, it sets a counter-
cyclical liquidity ratio target based on total private credit Lt to GDP.
LRTt =










Now potential employers and employees enter the labour market. Employers
select the employee with the lowest wage demands, according to the market
selection algorithm.
3.4.16 Production
Consumption firms produce consumption goods, using their most productive
capital goods first. Since they already chose the amount of labour necessary
for production, they produce using all available labour and capital.
∆CGcf,t = µllcf,tKGcf,tµk. (21)
Capital firms produce according to:
∆KGkf,t = µllkf,t. (22)
3.4.17 Consumption demand
Households set desired consumption cdhh,t as a fixed share α
y of their expected
net income plus a share αq of their expected net wealth, Dhh,t + CGhh,t.
The propensity to consume out of wealth responds to interest rate changes
αqt = α
q











In the consumption market, consumers are matched to the cheapest con-
sumption firm according to the common matching protocol.
3.4.19 Capital market - round 2
With the supplier fixed and credit obtained, consumption firms enter the
capital market again to purchase their desired capital goods.
3.5 Tax rate determination












3.5.1 Payment on obligations
Then, interactions take place as a consequence of equity, credit, deposits,
and other contractual claims. There are several types of credit claims in
the model. Banks have loan claims on firms, interbank claims on other
banks, and they may own government bonds. The central bank may own
government bonds and in addition might have lent reserves to deficit banks
in the form of advances. Every period, these credit claims cause repayment
and interest payments from debtors to creditors.
There are two types of transferable debt claims in the model. Banks and
the government hold reserves at the central bank. Households and firms
hold deposit accounts at banks. This leads to payments of interest on these
claims. Furthermore, reserves and deposits are used to settle payments by
the government; reserves are used for inter-bank payments; deposits are used
to settle household and firm payments.
Finally, some debt claims are off-balance sheet but are implied by con-
tracts. These are tax, social benefits, and wage claims. Households, banks
and firms are all obliged to pay income taxes to the government; all em-
ployers (the government, firms and banks) are obliged to pay wages to their
household employees. The government has an obligation to pay social secu-
rity to unemployed households.
We now describe the payments due on every obligation, j, in every set of
obligations, P . First, firms pay interests due on outstanding loans to banks,





Then, firms and the government pay wages to each household employee





The government pays unemployment benefits to unemployed workers at


























Banks also pay interest to households and firms over their deposit liabil-





At the end of each period, the central banks calculates its profits rcb,t by
subtracting the interest it pays on excess reserve deposits iRRb,t−1 from the
interest receipts on government bonds i¯BBt−1 and from advances i¯Acb,tAcb,t.
rcb,t = i¯
BBt−1 + i¯Acb,tAcb,t − iRRb,t−1. (33)
After that, the central banks transfers its profit to the government.
∆Rb,t = rcb,t. (34)
Firms pay dividends to their capital suppliers by multiplying their after-
tax profit with the dividend pay-out ratio:
∆Df,t = ρxrf,t. (35)
They distribute these dividends among households proportionally to net
wealth. Banks determine the amount of dividends they distribute based on
their desired capital ratio,
∆Df,t =
{





After that, firms pay taxes to the government by multiplying their profits
by the tax rate.
∆Df,t = τ
rr. (37)
Finally, households pay a flat tax rate τy over their wages whh,t, divi-












In the next step, consumers switch banks if they observe a more favourable
deposit rate than the one they receive from their current bank.
3.5.3 Bankruptcies
If, at any point, a firm’s or a bank’s assets minus its liabilities are below
zero, it enters a state of default,
dff,t =
{





True if Rb + IBb + Lb +Bb −Db −Ab < 0
False , otherwise
. (40)
If in default, firms and banks are bailed in by their household owners
and their depositors, see Caiani et al. Caiani et al., 2016 for an extended
description of this process. This happens so that the total number of firms
and banks remains constant.
3.5.4 Bond supply
The government calculates its deficit as tax revenues plus central bank prof-
its, minus wages, unemployment benefits and interest on bonds. To cover
the deficit, it issues bonds to the amount ∆Bt at a fixed price p
B.
∆Bsg,t =
txg,t + rcb,t −
∑




Banks try to buy government bonds with their excess reserves.
Bdb,t =
{




After that, if a bank still has excess reserves, it determines its demand for
reserves, or supply of inter-bank loans, on the inter-bank market as the
difference between reserve requirement Rdbt = DbtLR
d








Subsequently, reserve-supplying banks adjust their mark up on the price
of reserves. This mark-up is the difference between their average generic
interest rate i¯lb,tL and the risk free reserves rate i
R







Reserve–supplying and reserve–demanding banks are then matched on
the interbank market according to the general matching protocol.
3.5.7 Government bond market -second interaction
Any bonds which were not purchased by private banks will then be pur-
chased by the central bank, so that central bank demand for bonds will be




3.5.8 Central bank lending facilities
Finally, if banks cannot obtain enough reserves on the inter-bank market,
they borrow the remainder from the central bank as advances. The central







We initialze the model with 4,000 households, 100 consumption firms, 20
capital firms, 10 banks, a single central bank, and a single government. We
apply the six–step strategy for initializing the model described in Caiani et
al. (2016) Caiani et al., 2016. For model consistency, it is important that for
all agents, assets equal liabilities plus net worth. We determine initial values
of all parameters and state variables consistent with an aggregate stock-
flow consistent model in a steady state. Next, we distribute the aggregated
variables homogeneously and symmetrically across agents. We create for
the first period a ‘memory‘ of fictitious past sales, past wages, past profits
and so on, as the basis for backward–looking expectations. We also define
a historical structure. That is, we assume that in the periods before the
simulation starts, firms obtained loans and consumption firms invested in
new capital to maintain their productive capacity.
We further assume that the real value (i.e. corrected for inflation) of the
new loans or of the new capital goods was constant in each of these periods.
Based on a constant inflation rate and an amortization schedules for capital
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goods and loans, we derive the outstanding value for each of these stocks,
so that their total value sums up to the amount determined in the previous
step. Using this set-up, no agent starts the simulation with an advantage
over other agents. Initial values are reported in Table 2 in the appendix.
4 Results
To control for stochastic effects introduced in several equations and during
the market matching mechanism, we run fifty Monte Carlo simulations of
the baseline model.
4.1 Model dynamics
Starting from completely homogeneous initial conditions the models starts
to evolve to a more heterogeneous distribution of firms, banks and house-
holds. The model does not converge to an equilibrium state in which all
competing influences are exactly balanced. Even though it is pretty stable,
the simulated economy fits the description of Arthur Arthur, 2013 and is
always in a state of flux, constantly evolving and changing.
4.1.1 Business cycles
Figure 4 shows that real GDP is relatively stable. The model generates en-
dogenous business cycles which are characterized by pro-cyclical consump-
tion and investment, see Figure 8 for a comparison of these properties to
U.S. data. Following Eq. 8, consumption firms investment demand is driven
by their desired rate of capacity growth, which in turn is driven by returns
on capital and the current rate of capacity utilization. If consumption firms
are not denied credit by banks, they will buy machines from capital firms.
Investment by consumption firms drives down unemployment, both as con-
sumption firms hire employees to work the machines and as capital firms
hire employees to produce machines.
However, rising wages do not always translate into rising consumption.
The trend in consumption is largely mirrored by the trend in net-income.
Net-income is the sum of wage, dole, dividend, and interest income minus
taxes. As households are both workers and capital owners, wages may rise
at the expense of dividend income, balancing changes in net-income.
Figure 4 (top-left panel) shows that unemployment fluctuates between
0% and 12% on average. It might happen that, the economy temporarily
reaches full employment. Such periods of full-employment are accompanied
by stable consumption levels. Full employment puts a cap on the investment
boom. Firms cannot expand production any further as they cannot hire
new employees. At that point, any negative development in bank lending
18
behaviour, firm profitability, or reversal of fortunes for investment driving
firms might usher in a decrease in investment.
Figure 4: Monte Carlo average and standard deviation of: (top-left)
real GDP, (top-right) unemployment, (bottom-left) real investment, and
(bottom-right) real consumption.
Once that happens, falling investment leads to falling sales for capital
firms and a couple them go bankrupt. This causes a reduction in household
wealth and dividend income which in turn leads to falling consumption.
Falling operating cash flows lead to a further reduction in investment de-
mand and unemployment starts to rise.
Eventually investment downturns do turn around. Here heterogeneity
plays a crucial role. While average capacity and return on capital decreases
some firms continue to do well. These firms keep investing in a downturn.
As weak firms de-investment is constrained at the depreciation rate of cap-
ital, the investment of strong firms might overtake the de-investment of the
majority of smaller firms at a certain point. When this happens, the cycle
reverses.
4.1.2 Consumer price inflation
During the simulation the evolution of consumer prices switches twice from
deflation to inflation.
To understand inflation dynamics, we start by inspecting the pricing
behaviour of consumption firms. Eq. 5 shows that pricing behaviour is
determined by cost prices and an inventory based mark-up (Eq. 6). The
costs price term depends on several factors: labour costs and debt-service
costs over desired output. At any point in time inflation is driven by the
combination of these two factors.
During the first phase, prices generally fall. To understand the initial
deflation, we inspect changes in firm-mark ups -mark-up inflation- and cost
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prices -cost price inflation. The fall in cost prices is largely driven by a
drop in debt-service levels, as real investment is largely funded by retained
earnings. With low unemployment, wages increase across the board.
Then, while deflation is stable, its drivers change. Falling real sales cause
profits to decrease. This forces firms to borrow more to invest, increasing
debt service costs. Along with continued wage increases, firms cost price
increases. At the same time, falling real sales and expanding capacity cause
firms mark-ups to decrease, causing overall prices to continue to fall.
As profitability and capacity utilization shrink, firms invest less. Near
the end of the first deflationary phase, this dampens mark-up deflation un-
til it eventually flips to mark-up inflation. This ushers in the start of an
inflationary phase.
As real desired consumption is significantly above output capacity, firms
increase their mark-up. As firms are profitable and operate above desired
capacity utilization, they start investing heavily, steadily increasing debt ser-
vice costs. At the same time, unemployment is low and wages are increasing
steadily.
A tipping point in mark-up inflation occurs as the economy hits full
employment, slowing demand growth. The increase in debt-service costs as
a result of increased investment keeps overall inflation high for a while.
This persistent inflation decreases real demand. As demand drops, sales
and investment follow. This then affects the two primary inflation drivers.
Cost prices start to decline along with debt service and, as firms start pro-
ducing under desired capacity levels, mark-ups start falling as well, ushering
in another deflationary phase.
In this phase, mark-up deflation is the primary driver of consumer price
deflation. Even as demand starts to recover, firm capacity utilization is
consistently below target. General price deflation is a consequence of mark-
up deflation. Cost prices increase during this period. Cost price inflation
is somewhat more stable with a constantly increasing wage bill as its pri-
mary driver. Along with the wage bill, nominal consumption and sales also
increase.
Finally, the model enters a new inflationary phase. Both mark-up and
cost price inflation pick up and contribute roughly the same to overall in-
flation. In this phase, the behaviour of mark-up inflation is quite different
from the first inflationary phase. Firms are still substantially below capac-
ity. However, as real sales slowly increase, firms increase output, leaving
inventories very small. As a result, firms start investing more. Over the
course of this phase, while nominal consumption is still rising due to fast
rising consumer prices, real consumption starts dropping. Output follows
and so does the need for further investment. As investment drops, firms start
firing employees. Figure 5 shows the the changes in mark-up and cost-price
components along with inflation in each phase.
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Figure 5: Changes in consumer prices, and its components: (top-left) phase
1, (top-right) phase 2, (bottom-left) phase 3, and (bottom-right) phase 4.
4.1.3 The labour market
Household wages are largely determined by the amount asked by households
following Eq. 15. Because, unemployment is always relatively low, nominal
wages increase over the simulation.
4.1.4 Financial markets
Loan interest rates generally increase over the course of the simulation be-
cause capital ratios are consistently below target until they stabilize when
bank profitability rises as a consequence of increased interest rates. When
capital ratios are above target, banks no longer try to raise their prices to
increase capital. As a result, loan rates stabilize. Furthermore, deposit rates
are generally stable until funding costs of banks start to fall. The interbank
rate converges to the loan rate mark-up when liquidity ratios are consis-
tently above target. Finally, following Eq. 14, banks ration credit quite
consistently throughout the simulation. As expected, upturns in credit ra-
tioning largely coincide with upturns in investment demand. The beginning
of the simulation stands out though, when capital firms do not yet have
sufficient operating cash flows and are thus disproportionally denied credit.
4.1.5 Balance sheets
Figure 7 shows how aggregate sector stocks evolve over the course of the
simulation. We observe wealth accumulation by households and, to a lesser
extend, capital firms. The flip side is government debt accumulation. Inter-
bank loans are not visible in this overview as they net out on the banking
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Figure 6: Average and standard deviation of: (left) loan rates, (middle)
deposit rates, and (right) interbank rates and the SLF corridor.
sector balance sheet. Furthermore, while loans are important to firms, they
are dwarfed by the amount of bonds and reserves which banks hold.
Figure 7: Sectoral balance sheet compositions of (1) consumption firms, (2)
households, (3) capital firms, (4) banks, (5) the central bank, and (6) the
government.
4.2 Validation
As the purpose of our model is mainly to illustrate the workings of four
monetary transmission channels in an agent-based model, we do not perform
a full scale validation exercise.
We do compare autocorrelation and cross-correlation properties of simu-
lated time series for real-GDP, real investment, real consumption and unem-
ployment with those of the United States. In spite of the model not being
calibrated to fit this data, the model is able to replicate these properties
reasonably well, similar2 to the benchmark model Caiani et al., 2016.
2the main differences come from the timescale change.
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From The Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database, we retrieve
data for unemployment, real GDP, real consumption, and real investment.
Like the artificial time-series, the observed data covers a period of 33 years
(approximately 400 months). Since the observed data is quarterly, we trans-
form our simulated data series to a quarterly time-scale first. Then, we apply
a HP Hodrick and Prescott, 1997 filter to separate the cyclical and trend
components for both the actual and simulated data series. Following Caiani
et al. (2016) Caiani et al., 2016, we compare the moments for the cyclical
component of the time series.
Figure 8 shows the simulated and observed auto-correlations and cross-
correlations of the cyclical series with real-GDP. The auto-correlation struc-
ture of simulated and observed times series both have strong first order au-
tocorrelations. Furthermore, as in the real-world data, simulated consump-
tion and investment are pro-cyclical while unemployment is counter-cyclical.
These dynamics are robust across multiple Monte-Carlo simulations.
Figure 8: Auto- and cross correlations of (from left to right) real GDP, real
investment, unemployment, and real consumption for U.S. and simulated
data (Monte Carlo average and standard deviations).
4.3 Monetary transmission
We run several experiments to probe the effects of a monetary policy rate
hike on key variables. We are interested in variables from interest-rate pass-
through, the bank lending channel Ls, the investment channel ID, consump-
tion channel CDhh, the cost channel i
LL, and finally inflation pCG.
At different points in time, we apply a change to the deposit facility rate,
and with it the marginal lending facility rate (see Eq. 18) at different shock
sizes. Combining these, we perform sixteen unique experiments. For every
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experiment, we run fifteen Monte Carlo simulations.
Table 1 shows the Monte Carlo average effect of each rate hike, Ψmon,
at times tmon, on each variable, averaged over 40 periods after the shock.
Using a two-sided t-test, we measure if the Monte-Carlo Average over these
period was significantly (at 5 percent significance level) different from the
baseline, marked with a ∗ in the table.
4.3.1 Interest rate pass-through
The monetary transmission mechanism starts when the monetary policy
shock influences the interbank market, see Figure 9 for an impression of
how this works. Following Eq. 44, banks determine their interbank ask
price iIBb as the difference between the rate they charge on loans and the
risk free rate corrected for maturity. The central bank rate hike increases
banks’ funding costs through the interbank market by increasing the cost of
advances. As the risk free rate rises, interbank rates follow. Table 1 shows
the impact of all shocks on interbank rates is positive and significant.
Figure 9: Monte Carlo average and standard deviations inter-bank rates in





mon (bottom-left), and t
4
mon (bottom-right).
Banks set deposit rates according to Eq. 10, increasing or decreasing
their rates based on profitability, χp, liquidity, χLR, and funding costs, χfu.
Of these, only funding costs are directly affected. These increase, especially
for those banks who derive a large part of their funding from advances or in-
terbank loans. Yet, as in our simulation, banks do not rely heavily on either.
Pass through is limited. Furthermore, as the interest rate affects profitabil-
ity and liquidity through other variables, pass-through to deposit rates is


















































































































































































Table 1: Average 40 period impact of monetary policy rate hikes on se-
lected variables, at different points in time, * notes a significant (0.05)
deviation from the baseline. We apply shocks of size: Ψ1,2,3,4mon =
0.001, 0.002, 0.003, 0.004; at times: t1,2,3,4mon = 63, 166, 258, 355
Regarding loan rates, banks follow Eq. 9 and respond to changes in their
funding costs and capital ratio relative to their targeted capital ratio. As
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funding costs increase, loan rates increase. However, interbank and advances
rates are only a small part of the total funding cost mix for banks. Deposits
are a much more important source of funding. The effects of the rate hike on
the difference between actual and target capital ratios is not straightforward.
Therefore, similar to deposit rates, pass-through to loan rates is limited and
uncertain.
4.3.2 The bank lending channel
The bank lending channel describes how monetary policy affects the credit
supply. Following Eq. 14, banks only extend credit if they believe the
expected return is bigger than the expected loss. The central bank rate
hike influences the expected return, since cash flows are now discounted
at a higher rate. Therefore, if the bank interest rate is increased above
a threshold after which it is no longer profitable to lend, banks constrain
credit. The effect is especially non-linear if firms have similar cash flows and
collateral values. Indirectly, the rate hike also influences the interest rates
on loans and therefore the debt service and the value of collateral. However,
since interest-rate pass through is weak, this effect is similarly weak.
Therefore, in our simulations, monetary policy is only effective when
firms are relatively homogeneous, at t1mon, and when the hike is big enough,
at Ψ3mon or Ψ
4
mon. The rate hike increases banks discount factor, making
it so that from one moment to the next most firm credit applications are
negatively valued. In other simulations, these thresholds are not crossed and
as a result constrained credit is not significantly different from the baseline
simulation.
4.3.3 The investment channel
In our model, firm investment decisions are motivated by real factors. Fol-
lowing Eq. 7, firms determine a desired rate of growth based on expected
profit and capacity utilization. Both are indirectly affected by interest
changes. Following Eq. 11, firms try to finance their investment first with
equity. All terms in this equation are indirectly affected by the changes in
deposit and loan interest rates. Furthermore, weak bank rate pass-through
reduces the potency of the investment channel.
Table 1 shows that the effects of monetary policy on desired investment is
not clear cut. In the case of an early rate hike, investment demand actually
increases for high rate hikes. This happens because credit is constrained in
this scenario. Denied credit applications leave the firms demanding credit.
4.3.4 The consumption channel
In the model, monetary policy influences households desired consumption
directly by changing the propensity to consume out of wealth, and the ab-
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solute value of wealth and income (Eq. 23).
If interest-rate pass-through to deposits was positive: higher interest
rates on deposits would make consumption less attractive relative to saving.
On the other hand, increased interest rates receipts on deposit holdings
would increase household income and wealth. Note that, since there is
no household lending in the model, this effect is always positive. These
sub-mechanisms have opposite signs. A change in interest payments on
deposits causes increased income and increased consumption while at the
same time increasing the willingness to hold deposits rather than spending
on consumption.
Further, the effect of expected inflation depends on actual inflation,
which in turn depends on the strength of all transmission channels. The
strength and sign of the effect of the rate hike thus depends on the change
in propensity to consume, the importance of interest rate income for house-
holds and the total effect on inflation. The net effect is typically very small
since interest payments compared to other income are so small. Table 1
shows the effects of monetary policy on desired real consumption which are
typically small and indirect. Notably, the early rate hikes do impact desired
consumption significantly but primarily as the sudden credit crunch causes
an early downturn in the business cycle.
4.3.5 The cost channel
In our model, the cost channel operates as firms follow Eq. 5. Firms prices
are a mark-up of unit labour and interest rate costs. Changes in interest
rates charged by banks result in changes interest payments for firms. How-
ever, as pass-through is weak this effects is also weak. Conflicting mecha-
nisms are at work, since credit is rationed at higher interest rates, higher
rates lead to reduced debt-service costs for firms. Even if banks would pass-
through increased interest rates, overall costs would fall. The strength of the
cost channel thus depends greatly on the size of interest costs compared to
other costs, the amount of credit rationed through the bank lending channel,
and the other interaction effects. Table 1, therefore, shows that increased
interest rates on average reduce firm’s debt-service costs.
4.3.6 Inflation
We now analyse the effects of the shock on inflation. Table 1 shows that
monetary policy rate hikes can cause higher, lower or virtually unchanged
consumer prices, depending on the circumstances. Because of the various
simultaneous interaction effects, it is difficult to determine the effects on
inflation in most experiments. However, as interest-rate pass through is
very weak, monetary policy has no significant effect on consumer prices.
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5 Summary and Discussion
In this paper, we reviewed several policy transmission channels for monetary
policy. Based on existing literature, we identified eight channels. An ex-
pectations channel, which operates purely through agent expectations, and
seven interest rate based channels: the bank lending, balance sheet, invest-
ment, asset-price, consumption, cost, and exchange rate channels. For these
last six channels, we argued that the amount of interest rate pass-through
is of importance.
To illustrate how several transmission channels can interact in an agent-
based model, we presented a modified version of the Caiani et al. (2016)
Caiani et al., 2016 benchmark model which includes an interbank market and
four transmission channels: the bank lending channel, investment channel,
consumption channel, and the cost channel. Using this model, we simulated
the transmission of an interest rate shock through these channels.
The bank lending model is the strongest channel in our model as a conse-
quence of the structural and behavioural assumptions we made. Regarding
our structural assumptions, the balance sheet and asset price channels are
not modelled since the lack of a stock market makes it difficult to calcu-
late the market value of a firms equity. Similarly, the consumption channel
is weak because there are no asset markets that can be inflated to boost
consumption and there is no household lending. The investment channel is
weak because we assume that firm investment decisions are primarily driven
by non-interest rate factors and the bank lending channel is strong because
we assume banks make net-present value type calculations when rationing
credit.
In our model, monetary policy is not very effective. Several consequences
of a monetary policy shock stand out. First, the bank lending channel ap-
pears the strongest. Second, monetary policy effects are non-linear. Mone-
tary policy non-linearity in our model comes from agent heterogeneity and
macroeconomic feedback effects. In the bank lending channel, the lack of
agent heterogeneity causes non-linearity. Once the interest rate reaches a
certain threshold the majority of firm credit applications will not be funded.
This is also a contributing factor to the relevance of timing for policy
effects. As firm heterogeneity increases the effects of larger monetary policy
shocks get less extreme. Also contributing to this is that price changes have
different drivers over the course of the simulation. Inflation is driven by slack
in the consumer goods market –via the mark-up– or by slack in the labour
market -via the labour costs– or by changes in debt-service costs. These
are not equally affected by changes in monetary policy rates. Furthermore,
while the simulated economy shows some resilience to small shocks, large
shocks can change its macroeconomic dynamics significantly.
When monetary policy does not cause a credit crunch through the bank
lending channel, we find that the effects of monetary policy are weak. This
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is consistent with the view that monetary policy is not an effective tool to
control inflation Arestis and Sawyer, 1998; Arestis and Sawyer, 2008.
Yet, we are cautious to translate these findings to policy advice, as our
model might not be an accurate representation of the real world. Notably, it
is lacking an asset market. Furthermore, there is no foreign sector which nul-
lifies the exchange rate channel. Finally, this model has not been extensively
validated.
In the agent-based modelling literature validation is still an open issue
Lamperti, 2017b. Validation can be split in two parts, output validation
and structural validation Manson, 2002. Structural validation concerns how
well agent-based model represents the conceptual model of the real-world
system. Output validation concerns how well the model output represents
output of the real-world. As discussed in the previous section, we believe
this model has most structural features of a monetary economy barring an
asset market and a foreign sector.
Regarding output validation, a consensus seems to be that policy ori-
ented agent-based models should at least be able to replicate a number of
stylized facts that characterize the relevant subject area. Ideally, the model
should be able to reproduce multiple stylized facts at both the macro and
micro level Axtell and Epstein, 1994.
One drawback of this focus on different stylized facts is that it is hard
to compare models. Therefore, Lamperti (2017) Lamperti, 2017a suggest
another approach to directly compare to the degree of similarity between
the dynamics observed in the data and those generated by the different
models based.
Furthermore, Guerini and Moneta (2017) Guerini and Moneta, 2017
note, models that incorporate different causal structures may replicate the
same stylized facts. They therefore propose a method to focus only on
representing causal structures among aggregate variables of the ABM and
test whether they significantly differ from the causal structures that can be
found in the real-world from observed aggregate variables. As the purpose
of our model is to explore the monetary transmission mechanisms, we do
not subject it to a these validation exercises.
That being said, we do constrast our findings with those of contempo-
rary agent-based monetary models. We see that they reach widely diverging
conclusions. Models which assume a strong direct monetary policy trans-
mission through the expectations channel come to the conclusion that the
monetary policy rule has a strong effect on inflation Raberto, Teglio, and
Cincotti, 2008 Salle, Yıldızog˘lu, and Se´ne´gas, 2013, Salle, 2015, Dosi et al.,
2015, Popoyan, Napoletano, and Roventini, 2017.
In contrast to experiments Delli Gatti et al. Delli Gatti et al., 2011
performed, Delli Gatti and Desiderio Delli Gatti and Desiderio, 2015 find
a clear non-neutrality of monetary policy once they include an investment
channel: firm credit demand is decreasing step-wise with the interest rate.
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Finally, in the model of Bouchaud et al. Bouchaud et al., 2017 a high number
of transmission channels are active. First is the expectations channel, which
assumes that individual expectations are formed using both the central bank
target and actually realised inflation. Through this channel the central bank
inflation target and its credibility directly influence household consumption
and firm pricing decisions. Furthermore, firms hiring and firing decisions are
influenced by the interest rate through financial fragility, which increases if
interest rates rise. Since both models assume interest pass-through is one-
to-one, monetary policy has a major impact on the modeled economies.
If, we compare these conclusions to our own conclusions it becomes ap-
parent that the transmission channels that we chose to model have a major
influence on model conclusions about the effectiveness of monetary policy.
Therefore, we believe it is important modelers take into account empirical
work on the potency of different channels. After all, channels long taken for
granted might not always hold. We refer to interesting work on the ability of
central banks to anchor inflation expectations Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers,
2003; Kumar et al., 2015 and on interest rate pass-through which is typically
less than one-to-one Kleimeier and Sander, 2006.
In future work, besides adding more empirically grounded channels, we
want to validate the model, presented here, in more detail. First, we want
our model to be able to reproduce empirical regularities on different time
scales. Furthermore, we would like to asses if the model to be able to
reproduce causal structures among aggregate variables similar to the causal
structures that can be found in the real-world.
Other options for future work include following clusters of firms, bank
and households through simulation time, observing how their balance sheets
and activities change due to the Central Bank rate shock, and due to their
interactions with other agents. This heterogeneity in response is key to
understanding aggregate impacts, as Yellen (2016) Yellen, 2016 stressed.
Other promising avenues are to observe the effects of negative rate shocks
and even negative interest rates at different points in time. Furthermore,
we believe extending the economy with an asset market and household debt
would uncover other important channels. Yet another extension of the anal-
ysis is to take the simulation data and tease out the key patterns and cor-
relations with econometric methods. This is one way to assess the role of
channels of monetary policy transmission in this artificial economy, just as
is often done with actual data.
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A Variables and parameters
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Symbol Description Initial value
∆Yss
Nominal rate of growth in the steady
state
0.0024
Popsizehh Number of households 4000
Popsizecf Number of consumption firms 100
Popsizekf Number of capital firms 20
Popsizeb Number of banks 10
Popsizeg Number of governments 1
Popsizecb Number of central banks 1
lkf,cf,g Consumption firms initial workers 500, 2600, 780
m Initial unemployment 0.08
pkf,cf Goods prices by type 1.2625, 0.1643
iL,D,A,B,Rb Initial interest rate on debt 0.0024, 0.0008, 0.0008, 0.0008, 0
CRtr, LRtr Initial banks’ target prudential measure 0.08422, 0.1551
iRcb CB interest rate on reserves (bank rate) 0
w Initial wages 5
∆pCG Inflation 0.00246627
ρhh Dividends received 1022.7246
Y Nominal GDP 18303.8210132755
rkf,cf,b Profits received by sector 18.68515, 1102.4699, 47.1388
ykf,cf Sales by sector 2525, 15778.8210
uckf,cf Unit costs by sector 1.25, 0.1494
OCFkf,cf Operating cash flows for firms 17.5140, 2100.9267
A Initial quantity of advances 0
Bc,cb Bonds held by sector 269845.1258, 56965.5549
Lkf,cf Initial loans per sector 1990.5041, 42037.8831
Rb,g Reserves held by sector 56965.5549, 0
Dhh,kf,cf Initial deposits per sector 352630.6774, 2500, 12000
Gkf,cf Initial inventory per sector 200, 9600
KGcf Initial machines 120000
Ψuccf




Initial mark-up on unit labour costs for
capital firms
0.075
Table 2: Global Variables
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Symbol Description Possible values
idx Unique agent identifier 1 - 8121
Dx Amount of deposits 0 - ∞
CGx Amount of consumption goods 0 - ∞
KGx Amount of capital goods 0 - ∞
Lx Amount of loans 0 - ∞
Rx Amount of reserves 0 - ∞
Bx Amount of bonds 0 - ∞
Ax Amount of advances 0 - ∞
IBx Amount of interbank loans 0 - ∞
dfx Indicates whether an agent has defaulted True, False
ephh Identifier of the employer
Bank, firm, or
government
lx List of identities of workers List of households
vc Variable costs 0 - ∞
lc Unit labour costs 0 - ∞
o Output 0 - ∞
u Capacity utilization 0% - 100%
y Sales 0- ∞
k Selected supplier Firm identifier
nLb Non performing loans List of loans
iLb
Internal benchmark rate bank charges on
loans
0% - 100%
iDb Rate on deposits 0% - 100%
iIBb Rate for extending an interbank loan 0% - 100%
CR Capital adequacy ratio 0% - 100%
LR Liquidity ratio 0% - 100%
pB
Face value at which the government is
willing to release bonds
100%
iB
The percentage the government pays on
the face value of government bonds
0% - 100%
iR Rate on central bank reserve deposits -10% - 10%
CR Capital adequacy ratio 0% - 100%
LR Liquidity Ratio 0% - 100%
Table 3: Agent State Variables
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Symbol Description Initial value
αq,y




Propensity to distribute dividends out of
excess capital
0.2
β Risk aversion 0.01
γ Adaptive expectations weight 0.25
D = L = B




Intensity of choice in the consumption
and capital goods markets
1.50515
ζu,w
Share of workers leaving their employer,
wage costs kept as a liquidity buffer
0.01, 1
ηL,B,M Loans, Bonds, Machines duration 20, 5, 20
θ∆k
given a a 15% and 20% price difference
between old and new
50%
θdf Probability of default free
ιcf Haircut on defaulted firms’ capital value 0.5
κtrcf Desired capacity rate of growth free
µl
Productivity of labour for capital,
consumption firms
2, 1
Gtrf,t inventory buffer target 0.1
utrc,t Desired rate of capacity utilization 0.8
ξ
Number of potential partners interbank
market, goods markets, deposit and
credit markets, labour market
10, 5, 3, 10
ρ Dividend pay-out ratio firms, banks 0.9, 0.6
σm
unemployment benefits as a share of
average wage
0.3
τy = τ r Tax rate on income and profit 0.18
φu
Unemployment threshold (wage revision
function)
0.08
φpru Prudential threshold 0.1
φmon Monetary threshold 0.01
χCG,KG,D,L,W
Information asymmetry in consumption /
capital goods, credit / deposit and labour
markets
5, 3, 10
Ψpru Policy mark-up for prudential policy 0.0025
ΨiR Bank rate mark-up 0.025
Ω1 Profit rate weight (Investment function) 0.01
Ω2






Folded normal distribution mean and
standard deviation
(1, 0.0094)
Table 4: Initialization of Parameters
38
